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Abstract
This study examines shifts in governmental religion policy and societal 
discrimination against religious minorities in Muslim-majority states after the 
Arab Uprisings by using the Religion and State round 3 (RAS3) dataset for 
the years 2009-2014 and by focusing on 49 Muslim-majority countries and 
territories. We build on threads of literature on religious pluralism in transitional 
societies to explain the changes in governmental religion policy and societal 
discrimination against religious minorities after the Arab Uprisings. This 
literature predicts a rise in all forms of discrimination in Arab Uprising states 
as compared to other Muslim-majority states, and an even more significant rise 
in societal religious discrimination since societal behavior can change more 
quickly than government policy, especially at times of transition. The results 
partially conform to these predictions. There was no significant difference in 
the shifts in governmental religion policy between Arab Uprising and other 
Muslim-majority states, but societal religious discrimination increased 
substantially in Arab Uprising states as compared to non-Arab Uprising states. 
Understanding the nature of religion policies and religious discrimination 
provides further opportunities to unveil the dynamics of regional politics as 
well as conflict prevention in the region.
Keywords: Arab Uprisings, religious policy, transitional regimes, societal discrimination
1. Introduction
The Arab Uprising, by demanding social justice and freedom, inspired hopes of change in a 
region where democratic prospects have been in short supply. 1 2  While demonstrations led 
to a stable political transformation in Tunisia, uprisings escalated from acts of violence into 
civil war in Syria, Libya, and Yemen. With the notable exception of Tunisia, a short-lived era 
Yasemin Akbaba, Associate Professor, Gettysburg College. Email: yakbaba@gettysburg.edu. 
Jonathan Fox, The Yehuda Avner Professor of Religion and Politics, Bar-Ilan University, Israel. Email: Jonathan.Fox@biu.ac.il.
1 This research was supported by the Israel Science Foundation Grant 23/14. Any opinions expressed in this study represent 
those of the authors and not necessarily the Israel Science Foundations. 
2 For earlier work on authoritarianism in the Middle East see Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the 
Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004): 139-57; and Jason Brownlee, 
Authoritarianism in the Age of Democratization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). For a discussion on ‘democratic 
deficit’ of the region before and after the uprisings see, Eric Chaney, George A. Akerlof and Lisa Blaydes, “Democratic Change 
in the Arab World, Past and Present,” Brooking Papers on Economic Activity 42, no. 1 (Spring 2012): 363-414; and Eva Bellin, 
“Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring,” Comparative Politics 44, 
no. 2 (2012): 127-49. For a political and historical context of Arab uprisings see Mehran Kamrava, ed., Beyond the Arab Spring: The 
Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
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of optimism in each region gave way to a state of chaos, confusion, and eventually what has 
come to be termed the “Arab Winter”.3 To a large extent, the goals of the Arab Uprisings were 
lost before they were realized. In the following months of protests, restrictions on freedom 
such as continuing or escalating discrimination against religious minorities surfaced.4
In the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, tensions remain high in the region as religious 
tolerance deteriorates in societies with already deep sectarian divides. However, scholarship 
on religious liberty has yet to capture the changing landscape of governmental religion 
policies (such as religious discrimination) since the Arab Uprisings. Although various studies 
suggest the deteriorating treatment of religious minorities in Arab Uprising states, Fox in 
his analysis of the treatment of religious minorities from 1990 to 2008 demonstrates that 
“religious discrimination is present and increasing” in both Christian and Muslim majority 
states, “including Western democracies which are supposed to be among the most tolerant 
in the world.” 5 With the exception of the Pew report, none of the relevant work compares 
religious discrimination trends in the pre- and post-Arab Uprising Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region with a cross-sectional, quantitative methodology.6 The Pew report 
covers only one Arab Uprising year (2011) and it does not provide detailed information on 
discrimination trends in different sub-categories, such as core Arab Uprising countries as 
compared to others. In addition, the Pew data does not differentiate between the religious 
freedom of religious minorities and the religious freedom of members of a country’s majority 
religion.7
This study asks the following questions: Has governmental and/or societal religious 
discrimination against religious minorities changed since the Arab Uprisings? Are 
governmental religious policy patterns different in Arab Uprising countries compared to non-
Arab Uprising countries in the MENA or non-MENA Muslim-majority states? We build on 
the threads of literature on religious pluralism in transitional societies to provide a viable 
theoretical framework that explains the changes in religion policies and discriminations 
against religious minorities after the Arab Uprisings. 
Transition periods present an opportunity for governments to update formal and informal 
policies of the state.  One prominent example of this is governmental religious discrimination. 
Previous scholarship on regime transition suggests that restrictions targeting religious 
minorities tend to increase at times of political transition. This literature predicts that all 
forms of religious discrimination against religious minorities will increase (alongside other 
governmental religious policies) in transitional regimes such as the Arab Uprising states as 
compared to non-Arab Uprising states in the region, as well as in other Muslim-majority 
3 “Politics in the Middle East: The Arab Winter,” The Economist, accessed August 26, 2016, http://www.economist.com/news/
middle-east-and-africa/21685503-five-years-after-wave-uprisings-arab-world-worse-ever. 
4 Monica D. Toft, “The Politics of Religious Outbidding,” The Review of Faith and International Affairs 11, no. 3 (2013): 
10-9. “Arab Spring Adds to Global Restrictions on Religion,” Pew Research Center, 2013, accessed December 20, 2016, http://
www.pewforum.org/2013/06/20/arab-spring-restrictions-on-religion-findings/; James Michael Nossett, “Free Exercise after the Arab 
Spring: Protecting Egypt’s Religious Minorities under the Country’s New Constitution,” Indiana Law Journal 89, no. 4, Article 8 
(2014); Barbara Ann Rieffer-Flanagan, “Statism, Tolerance and Religious Freedom in Egypt,” Muslim World Journal of Human 
Rights 13, no. 1 (2016): 1-24, accessed on 4 Jan. 2017, doi:10.1515/mwjhr-2015-0013; Fatima el-Issawi,  “The Arab Spring and the 
Challenge of Minority Rights: Will the Arab Revolutions Overcome the Legacy of the Past?” European View 10 (2011): 249-58. For 
instance, in 2011 government’s restriction on religion in Egypt was higher than any other country reported in the Pew (2013) report. 
In this study we found this to be true for societal discrimination, but not governmental discrimination. Moreover, Egypt’s scores for 
both were static, i.e. not changing from pre-Arab Uprising levels.  
5 Jonathan Fox, The Unfree Exercise of Religion: A World Survey of Religious Discrimination against Religious Minorities 
(New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 8. 
6 “Arab Spring Adds to Global Restrictions on Religion”. 
7 “Arab Spring Adds to Global Restrictions on Religion”.
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states outside of MENA. Societal behavior can change more quickly than governmental 
policy at times of transition since it takes longer to update the legal framework of a state than 
the attitudes of a society.8 Therefore, we predict that societal religious discrimination will 
escalate more than governmental religious discrimination in Arab Uprising states.
We utilize round three of the Religion and State (RAS) dataset, which includes data on 
governmental religion policy and societal discrimination between 2009 and 2014. In this 
study we focus on 49 Muslim-majority countries and territories. The analysis shows that 
there is no evidence that government policy in Arab Uprising states changed significantly 
in a manner different from other Muslim-majority states. This applies to government-based 
discrimination against religious minorities, regulation of the majority religion and all religions 
in the country, and support for religion. The results indicate that societal discrimination 
increased substantially in Arab Uprising states as compared to other Muslim-majority states. 
Taking into consideration identity-based divides that shape regional politics, these results 
present implications for conflict prevention in the region.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: Section two reviews the existing 
literature on religious freedom in transitional regimes in the context of the Arab Uprisings. 
The research design section, presents the data and operationalization of the variables. We will 
then report our findings, and finally, present our conclusions. 
2. Religious Pluralism in Transitional Societies 
Regime transitions are known to be complex experiences that yield a diverse set of political 
outcomes. Scholarship on transitional regimes finds democratization attempts to produce 
intolerant governmental and social attitudes that welcome nationalist and religious outbidding 
tendencies.9 Transitional regimes tend to restrict religious freedom as religion revives and 
religious regulations increase.10 In addition, in a transitional regime, the desire for legitimacy 
leads to the creation of religion policies that aim to strengthen the government’s authority 
and power. Interestingly, a government’s yearning for legitimacy does not yield a single 
form of religious policy. As Fox suggests, states may “seek religious legitimacy” or simply 
“fear its use against the state.” 11 Egypt’s political adventures since the Arab uprisings present 
an example of this complexity. Right after the uprisings, the Muslim Brotherhood, as a 
significant political force, highlighted its legitimacy through religious policies that expanded 
the role of religion in politics. Since the toppling of Morsi and political marginalization of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, legitimacy of the government is centered on control of religion. 
Simply put, aspects of government religion policy may emerge as governmental religious 
discrimination, religious support or restrictions placed on all religions. 
This paper situates post-Arab Uprising governmental religion policies under the 
transitional regime scholarship to understand how religious liberty has changed in a region 
where the “robustness of authoritarianism”12 and “democratic deficit”13 had been defining 
attributes for many years.  
8 It is important to acknowledge that the reverse, i.e. government policy changing more quickly than societal behavior, could 
be true as well. 
9 Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: W.W Norton, 2000); Toft, “The 
Politics of Religious Outbidding”.
10 John Anderson, Religious Liberty in Transitional Societies: The Politics of Religion (Cambridge University Press, 2003).
11 Fox, The Unfree Exercise of Religion, 77.
12 Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism”. 
13 Chaney, Akerlof and Blaydes, “Democratic Change in the Arab World”.
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There are several bodies of literature that examine transitional regimes and 
democratization.14 Part of this scholarship identifies the likely conditions and characteristics 
of transitional systems, such as the “politicization of ethnicity and the rise of nationalist 
movements,”15 as well as the increasing tendencies toward violence and war.16 Mansfield and 
Snyder17 suggest “institutional capacity”, “severe ethnic divisions”, “democratic character of 
the surrounding international neighborhood”, and “availability of an effective power sharing 
system” to be important factors that shape the outcome of a transition. 
Transitional regime scholarship also explores how the transition process impacts ethnic 
and religious minorities. Embracing ethnic and religious pluralism has proven to be a 
common challenge to most transitional societies. It is frequently observed that minorities get 
“the short end of the stick” at times of transition due to the collective mindset of the majority. 
This mindset tends to focus on preserving the national unity of the state, which is perceived 
to be weak, fragile and unstable, at the expense of pluralism. Anderson,18 referring to survey 
data from “post-Soviet societies”, reveals peoples’ perception of democratic rights: 
…for many people strong leadership and the restoration of ‘order’ were more important than 
democratic niceties, and that society and elites had yet to imbibe the values of tolerance and 
acceptance of diversity that tend to underpin mature democratic states.
Although it does not focus on transitional regimes, securitization scholarship suggests a 
similar dynamic. Securitization theory suggests a state representative can securitize an issue 
by invoking security.19 Securitized issues are prioritized since they pose a threat to national 
security. The urgency of eliminating a threat opens the possibility of using unusual strategies.20 
In some cases, these strategies are not guided by democratic norms and principles even in 
democratic states. A religion or a religious group could be securitized. For instance, Cesari 
examines the securitization of Islam. 21 This theory is also used to explain restrictions on 
religious freedom. Fox and Akbaba use securitization theory to study religious discrimination 
against Muslims in comparison to other religious minorities in Western Democracies.22
Patriotic sentiments tend to strengthen exclusionary policies as competition among 
political actors facilitates the marginalizing political rhetoric that targets ethnic and/or 
religious minorities.23 In addition, harsh responses to the demands of minority groups are 
14 For pioneering works on this see Guillermo A. O’Donnell et. al. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for 
Democracy (Baltimore;London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986) and Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996).
15 Timothy Frye, “Ethnicity, Sovereignty and Transitions from Non-Democratic Rule,” Journal of International Affairs 45, no. 
2 (1992): 623. 
16 Snyder, From Voting to Violence; Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Prone to Violence: The Paradox of the Democratic 
Peace,” The National Interest 82 (2005/06): 39-45.
17 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Arab Spring,” International Interactions 38, no. 5 (2012): 
723. 
18 Anderson, Religious Liberty in Transitional Societies, 2.
19 Ole Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” in On Security, ed.  Ronnie Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1995), 46-87; Ole Wæver, “Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New 'Schools' in Security Theory and their Origins between 
Core and Periphery” (paper presented at annual meeting for ISA Conference, Montreal, March 2004); J. Huysmans, “Security: What 
do you mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier,” European Journal of International Relations 4, no. 2 (1998): 226-55. 
20 Carsten Bagge Lausten and Ole Wæver, “In Defense of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects for Securitization,” in Religion in 
International Relations: The Return from Exile, ed. Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos (Palgrave: Macmillan, 2003), 147-80.  
21 Jocelyne Cesari, “The Securitization of Islam in Europe,” (CEPS Challenge, Research Paper No. 15, April 2009). 
22 Jonathan Fox and Yasemin Akbaba, “Securitization of Islam and Religious Discrimination: Religious Minorities in Western 
Democracies, 1990 to 2008,” Comparative European Politics 13 (2015): 175-97.
23 For a description of the process for religious minorities see, John Anderson, Religious Liberty in Transitional Societies: The 
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normalized as ethnic and religious outbidding tendencies increase.24 
Outbidding scholarship advances our understanding of societies in transition and what 
this means for pluralism. According to Snyder’s25 work on nationalist outbidding, political 
elites utilize outbidding tendencies to improve their nationalistic qualifications26. Mansfield 
and Snyder27 suggest transitions to democratic regimes with “weak domestic institutions” 
can be violent, and that tensions across ethnic groups can be high at these times.28 Since 
countries with “weak domestic institutions” are not equipped to accommodate the increasing 
political demands of previously marginalized groups, these countries often end up with 
“belligerent ethnic nationalism or sectarianism” that then inspires either civil strife or outside 
intervention.29 
Much like in the nationalist outbidding process, in religious outbidding, political elites 
use religious outbidding to better qualify for their position. Toft30 outlines the dynamics and 
conditions of religious outbidding and explains why it is common in transitional regimes. In 
the process of religious outbidding, political elites try to outbid the opposition by reframing 
“secular domestic threats to their tenure … as religious threats.”31 She suggests that religious 
outbidding frequently takes place in transitional regimes as it presents an opportunity for 
political actors to boost their credentials domestically and internationally.32
Posen33 highlights a similar mechanism as he applies the security dilemma concept of 
international relations theory to ethnic conflict scholarship. Posen34 suggests that “the collapse 
of imperial regimes can be profitably viewed as a problem of ‘emerging anarchy.’” As groups 
try to address security concerns due to the disintegration of a central government, they could 
create security concerns for others that then lead to a security dilemma. In other words, much 
like international actors, ethnic groups could challenge the security of other groups as they 
try to advance their own security. Posen’s application is expanded to understand the role of 
discrimination in the context of the ethnic security dilemma. 35
Political transitions in Southern and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and South Africa 
(among others), ushered in a research agenda on democratic consolidation and religious 
pluralism in transitional regimes.36 Although commitment to religious freedom and high 
Politics of Religion (Cambridge University Press, 2003).
24 Toft, “The Politics of Religious Outbidding”. For more on outbidding see Michael G. Findley and Joseph K. Young, “More 
Combatant Groups, More Terror?: Empirical Tests of an Outbidding Logic,” Terrorism and Political Violence 24, no. 5 (2012): 706-
21. 
25 Snyder, From Voting to Violence.
26 For more on ethnic outbidding and ethnic political parties see Kanchan Chandra, “Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability,” 
Perspectives on Politics 3, no. 2 (2005): 235-52.
27 Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and the Arab Spring,” 722.
28 For more on ethnic conflict in the Middle East and the spread of ethnic conflict across borders see Jonathan Fox, “Are 
Middle East Conflicts More Religious?” Middle East Quarterly 8, no. 4 (2001): 31-40; Jonathan Fox, “Is Ethnoreligious Conflict a 
Contagious Disease?” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27, no. 2 (2004): 89-106.
29 Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and the Arab Spring,” 722.
30 Toft, “The Politics of Religious Outbidding”.
31 Toft, “The Politics of Religious Outbidding,” 10.
32 Toft, “The Politics of Religious Outbidding”.
33 Barry R. Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” Survival 35, no. 1 (1993): 27-47.
34 Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,”27.
35 For example,Yasemin Akbaba, Patrick James and Zeynep Taydas [“The Chicken or the Egg? External Support and Rebellion 
in Ethnopolitics,” in Intra-State Conflict, Government and Security: Dilemmas of Deterrence and Assurance, eds. Stephen M. 
Saideman and Marie-Joelle Zahar (London; New York: Routledge, 2008), 161-81.] examines security dilemma, discrimination 
against ethnic groups and internationalization of ethnic conflicts. 
36 See Aleš Črnič, “Religious Freedom and Control in Independent Slovenia,” Sociology of Religion 64, no. 3 (2003): 349-66; 
Ani Sarkissian, “Religious Reestablishment in Post-Communist Polities,” Journal of Church and State 51, no. 3 (2009): 472-501; 
Hubert  Seiwert, “Freedom and Control in the Unified Germany: Governmental Approaches to Alternative Religions since 1989,” 
Sociology of Religion 64, no. 3 (2003): 367-75; Lourens M. du Plessis, “The Protection of Religious Rights in South Africa’s 
, 
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democratic performance appear to be a challenge, transitional societies do not treat religious 
communities in a uniform manner. Numerous attributes of states, such as dominant religious 
affiliation, overlap of national and dominant religious identity, fears of instability, and 
competition among religious actors within a state, are discussed as explanatory factors 
for this variation. However, despite this variation, previous research suggests a common 
pattern running across transitional societies regarding the treatment of religious minorities. 
Anderson37 examines the nature of religious freedom at times of change and how attitudes 
towards religious pluralism are shaped and guided by the need for national unity during 
unstable times by focusing on five transitional societies: Spain, Greece, Poland, Bulgaria, 
and the former USSR.38 Although there is variation in religious freedom in these cases, 
the author discusses the presence of “broad types or families of arguments” across the five 
transitional regimes.39 One of these arguments focuses on “a general need in transitional 
societies for order and stability in the face of uncertainty” which opens the way to “regulation 
of inappropriate or divisive religious activity.”40 Anderson41 successfully demonstrates the 
challenge of creating a democratic mentality in transitional societies and the implications of 
this process for religious minorities.   
Anderson reports that in most of the cases he examined, religion’s significance in 
politics increased due to “its role in discourses about national identity and models of future 
developments.”42 He claims that
the politics of religious liberty in transitional societies has a significance that transcends the 
narrowly religious. It suggests that religion will periodically erupt into the public domain, 
that the ‘privatization’ of religion is far from complete, and that historical legacies and 
contexts will continue to shape the ways in which politicians and political systems handle the 
public role of religion.43 
Religious legitimacy scholarship echoes this argument. Religion is known to be a double-
edged sword when used as a tool for political legitimacy. Faith and religious actors could 
boost or weaken the legitimacy of a government.44 Therefore, in transitional regimes we 
might observe a broad spectrum of religious policies, including governmental religious 
discrimination, religious support, or restrictions placed on all religions. Among different 
forms of religious policies, discrimination emerges as a prominent one.  Anderson suggests 
that “the countries where intolerance is more prominent are also countries where identity 
questions remain to the fore.”45  Moreover, he observes “a correlation between the broader 
level of societal tolerance and the degree of restriction or freedom available to minority 
religious groups.”46 Similarly, Sarkissian47 finds tendencies of religious discrimination in 
Transitional Constitution,” Koers 59, no. 2 (1994): 151-68. Anderson, Religious Liberty in Transitional Societies.
37 Anderson, Religious Liberty in Transitional Societies.
38 For other works of Anderson on religious pluralism see John Anderson, “Social, Political, and Institutional Constraints on 
Religious Pluralism in Central Asia,” Journal of Contemporary Religion 17, no. 2 (2002a): 181-96; John Anderson, “The Treatment 
of Religious Minorities in South-Eastern Europe:  Greece and Bulgaria Compared,” Religion, State & Society 30, no. 1 (2002b): 
9-31.
39 Anderson, Religious Liberty in Transitional Societies, 166.
40 Anderson, Religious Liberty in Transitional Societies, 166.
41 Anderson, Religious Liberty in Transitional Societies, 3, 22. 
42 Anderson, Religious Liberty in Transitional Societies, 184.
43 Anderson, Religious Liberty in Transitional Societies, 206.
44 Jonathan Fox, An Introduction to Religion and Politics: Theory and Practice (Oxon: Routledge, 2013).   
45 Anderson, Religious Liberty in Transitional Societies, 185.
46 Anderson, Religious Liberty in Transitional Societies, 205.
47 Sarkissian, “Religious Reestablishment in Post-Communist Polities,” 472.
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transitional societies as she explores the “stalled progress in the realm of religious freedom” 
in post-communist states. More specifically, she suggests that “the benefits allotted to 
formally and informally established churches are often accompanied by legislation that 
attempts to curb minority religious rights. Moreover, minority religious groups often suffer 
from campaigns intended to instill fear in local populations, and are perceived as a threat to 
‘traditional’ religions and national culture.”48
However, there is no study that situates the ebb and flow of post-Arab Uprising religion 
policies under the broader transitional regime literature. Prior to the uprisings, discrimination 
against religious minorities was considered to be “the rule rather than the exception” in the 
region.49 For instance, the Pew Research Center reported that governmental restrictions on 
religion and social hostilities involving religion scores have been higher in the Middle East 
and North Africa than in any other region over the 2007-2011 time frame.50 The same report 
also noted an increasing trend of social hostilities involving religion in the Middle East and 
North Africa for 2011.51 Moreover, various studies suggested worsening treatment of religious 
minorities in Arab Uprising states.52 Studies on the causes of discrimination identify various 
factors in order to explain variations in restrictions such as regime type, past discrimination 
of the state, and population dynamics.53 
Findings on regime type suggest that democracies discriminate less than non-
democracies.54 Economic development is known to influence the dynamics of discrimination, 
but the direction of its impact is not clearly established.55  It is also commonly argued that 
regimes with a history of discrimination are likely to repeat similar policies.56  In addition, 
recent research on religious restrictions highlights the rise of religious discrimination over 
time.  Fox57 shows that there is a worldwide rise in different forms of governmental religion 
policy including support for majority religions and regulation of religion in general. Thus, 
any post-Arab Uprisings rise in religious discrimination or other forms of religion policy in 
Arab Uprising states may be part of a larger worldwide trend rather than due to the events of 
the Arab Uprisings.
These works provide useful guideposts for highlighting scope of change in the region for 
religious groups. However, scholarship on religious minorities is yet to capture the changing 
landscape of religious discrimination since the Arab Uprisings. More specifically, shifts in 
governmental and/or societal religious discrimination against religious minorities as well as 
other types of government religion policy need to be examined. 
The transitional-society literature we outline above predicts an increase in both societal 
and governmental religious discrimination against religious minorities as well as an increase 
48 Sarkissian, “Religious Reestablishment in Post-Communist Polities,” 473.
49 Felix Neugart,  “Uncertain Prospects of Transformation: The Middle East and North Africa,” Strategic Insights 6, no. 12 
(2005): 2,  accessed December 21, 2016, http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/11342/Uncertain%20Prospects%20of%20
TransformationThe%20Middle%20East%20and%20North%20Africa.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
50 “Arab Spring Adds to Global Restrictions on Religion”.
51 “Arab Spring Adds to Global Restrictions on Religion”.
52 Nossett, “Free Exercise after the Arab Spring”; Rieffer-Flanagan, “Statism, Tolerance and Religious Freedom in Egypt”.
53 See Fox, The Unfree Exercise of Religion, 33-57, for a detailed discussion on previous research on causes of religious 
discrimination. 
54 Jonathan Fox, Political Secularism, Religion, and the State: A Time Series Analysis of Worldwide Data (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015); Ted R. Gurr, Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century (Washington D.C.: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000). 
55 Fox, The Unfree Exercise of Religion.
56 Gurr, Peoples versus States.
57 Fox, Political Secularism, Religion, and the State.
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in other types of government religion policy in Arab Uprising states as compared to other 
Muslim-majority states both inside and outside of the MENA. Furthermore, we anticipate 
societal religious discrimination to escalate more than governmental religious discrimination 
in Arab Uprising states. In their study on societal discrimination, Grim and Finke58 expand 
the conventional focus of religious discrimination literature, i.e. simply examining a state’s 
restriction of religious freedom, to include “social restrictions that inhibit the practice, 
profession, or selection of religion.” Their central argument is that societal restrictions are 
often a precursor to government-based restrictions on religious minorities. Implicit in this 
argument is that societal attitudes toward religious minorities change quickly based on 
current events and that these changes in societal attitudes, if they remain stable, eventually 
result in government policies which reflect them. However, policy change is slow and often 
lags behind societal change by a considerable margin.  Finke and Martin suggest that this 
lag-time exists because changing government policy through social pressure requires some 
organization: 
Working through social and political movements, as well as more formal political and 
religious institutions and leaders, the majority groups can reduce religious freedoms by 
advocating formal legislation or by applying informal pressures to local institutions.59 
We suggest that the political environment that emerged during the instability and regime 
change caused by the Arab Uprisings created opportunities for changes to develop in societal 
attitudes toward religious minorities, as well as the emergence of latent negative attitudes 
toward religious minorities. This then resulted in an increase in societal religious discrimination 
against religious minorities in the Arab Uprising states. However, the organization necessary 
for this to translate into government policy, assuming such a transition occurs, is likely to 
take more time.
For instance, after drawing parallels between a long history of state-level intolerance and 
societal-level intolerance in the case of Egypt, Rieffer-Flanagan suggests that “the societal 
discrimination, harassment and violence that prevents freedom of religion and belief from 
being realized in Egypt arises from intolerant messages in civil society, in the media and in 
educational settings”.60 The tendencies to perceive religious diversity as a threat to national 
unity increase with the marginalizing rhetoric that divides these societies along religious 
lines. 
As outlined in the previous paragraphs, the fragile condition of transitioning states, 
combined with religious outbidding tendencies and the impact of political openings for 
actors that were previously oppressed, facilitate and justify the tendencies of social religious 
discrimination against religious minorities. Times of transition involve social tension and 
polarization. Moreover, new institutional infrastructures tend to be weak at times of transition. 
In the same vein, we expect social hostilities to be more prominent than governmental 
discrimination. In other words, we expect social discrimination to be more visible than 
governmental discrimination since the political context can be more forgiving of social 
hostilities at times of transition and political upheaval.  Therefore, various groups and actors 
might display discrimination through societal discrimination rather than with governmental 
58 Brian J. Grim and Roger Finke, The Price of Freedom Denied: Religious Persecution and Conflict in the 21st Century (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 9.
59 Roger Finke and Robert R. Martin, “Ensuring Liberties: Understanding State Restrictions on Religious Freedoms,” Journal 
for the Scientific Study of Religion 53, no. 4 (2014): 690. 
60 Rieffer-Flanagan, “Statism, Tolerance and Religious Freedom in Egypt,” 11.
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discriminatory policies. In addition, long-lasting discriminatory policies at the state level 
make societal discrimination more acceptable at times of transition. Societal discrimination 
has a lower cost  since often, during times of transition, the state fails to protect or ignores 
the security concerns of religious minorities.61 What is more, societal behavior changes more 
quickly than government policy at times of transition since it takes longer to update the legal 
framework of a state.  The “rules of the game” are defined more rapidly by social norms 
than by government in transitional societies, and shape social interactions more dominantly. 
Therefore, in the aftermath of the uprisings, we expect an increase in social religious 
discrimination against religious minorities in Arab Uprising countries.
3. Research Design
3.1. Which countries are Arab Uprising countries?
While the Arab Uprisings is an often-discussed term, there are different perceptions of 
which countries are considered to have experienced the Arab Uprisings. Moreover, there are 
variations in the nature of the Arab Uprising movements and their outcomes.62 In addition, 
various terms such as unrest, uprising, protest, and demonstration are used to explain the 
diverse set of social mobilizations that have changed the political landscape of Middle 
East and North Africa. We draw from eight sources to determine which countries should 
be included in the study as Arab Uprising countries.63 We designated countries identified 
by at least seven of these sources as core Arab Uprising states (Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, 
Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen). Syria codings are available only through 2012 because after 
that year there was no effective government. Countries that are included in at least three 
of these sources are designated as other Arab Uprising states (Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Oman, and Saudi Arabia). All other Muslim-majority MENA states and territories 
are considered separately as a basis for comparison, as are all Muslim-majority countries 
outside the MENA.
3.2. The religion and state (RAS) round 3 dataset
This study uses data from 49 Muslim-majority countries in the RAS3 dataset and covers the 
years 2009-2014. This time period uses 2009 and 2010 as baselines for the years previous 
to the Arab Uprisings. As the first Arab Uprising began in late December 2010, most of its 
influence should begin in 2011. 2014 is the most recent year available in the RAS3 dataset.
61 Rieffer-Flanagan, “Statism, Tolerance and Religious Freedom in Egypt”.
62 Muzammil M. Hussain and Philip N. Howard, “What Best Explains Successful Protest Cascades? ICTs and the Fuzzy 
Causes of the Arab Spring,” International Studies Review 15 (2013): 58-9.
63 The following eight sources are used to identify core Arab Uprising states and other Arab Uprising states: 1- “Arab Uprising: 
Country by Country,” BBC News, accessed August 26, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-12482291; 2-  In “Politics in the 
Middle East: The Arab Winter,” The Economist, accessed August 26, 2016, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-
africa/21685503-five-years-after-wave-uprisings-arab-world-worse-ever, The Economist identifies “six Arab countries in which 
massive peaceful protests called for hated rulers to go in the Uprising of 2011”; 3- “The Arab Uprising’s Aftermath, in 7 Minutes,” The 
Atlantic, accessed August 26, 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/01/arab-Uprising-anniversary/416301/; 
4- Greg Botelho, “Arab Uprising Aftermath: Revolutions Give Way to Violence, More Unrest,” CNN, accessed August 26, 2016, 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/27/middleeast/arab-Uprising-aftermath/. We would like to note that language of this piece on Arab 
Uprising cases was not precise. Referring to the cases included in the text it states:  “Here's a look at some countries that were part 
of the Arab Uprising, and what's happened since.”; 5- “Arab Spring Adds to Global Restrictions on Religion”; 6- “Arab Uprising: 
an interactive timeline of Middle East protests,” The Guardian, accessed August 26, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/world/
interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactive-timeline; 7- Hussein and Howard,  “What Best Explains Successful Protest 
Cascades?”; 8- Andreas Boogaerts, “Beyond Norms: A Configurational Analysis of the EU’s Arab Spring Sanctions,” Foreign Policy 
Analysis (2016): 1-21, doi: 10.1093/fpa/orw052. 
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RAS3 was collected using the same methodologies as previous rounds of the RAS 
dataset. Each country was examined using multiple sources, including government reports, 
NGO reports, media reports (primarily from the Lexis-Nexis database), primary sources such 
as constitutions and laws, and academic sources. These reports were the basis for coding the 
variables.64
We use four variables from the RAS3 dataset, three which measure aspects of governmental 
religion policy, and one which measures societal discrimination against minority religions. In 
this section we briefly discuss the variables.65 
The first three focus on policies by governments that include laws, formal and informal 
government policies, and actions taken by government representatives and officials. First 
we measure governmental religious discrimination. This is defined as restrictions placed by 
the government or its representatives on the religious institutions or practices of religious 
minorities that are not placed on the majority religion. 66 Fox argues that the distinction between 
restrictions placed on minorities and those placed on the majority religion “is critical because 
actions that can be quite similar have considerably different implications depending on the 
object of these policies”. 67 For example, if restrictions on places of worship are applied to 
all religions, this implies a regime that is generally anti-religious; if this restriction is applied 
only to minority religions it implies a regime that is not necessarily opposed to all religion, 
just to minority religions. This measure looks at 36 types of restrictions placed on religious 
minorities, each coded individually, including 12 types of restrictions on religious practices, 
eight types of restrictions on religious institutions and clergy, seven types of restrictions on 
conversion and proselytizing, and nine other types of restrictions. Each individual type is 
coded on a scale of zero to three based on severity, resulting in a measure that ranges from 
zero to 108.
We then measure restrictions that are placed on all religions, including the majority religion. 
This measure includes 29 such restrictions, each coded individually, including five types of 
restrictions on religion’s role in politics, ten types of restriction on religious institutions, 
seven types of restriction on religious practices, and eight other types of restrictions. Each 
type is coded on a scale of zero to three based on severity, resulting in a measure that ranges 
from zero to 87.
Third, we measure religious support—the extent to which a government actively supports 
religion. This measure includes 52 types of support, each individually coded on a scale of zero 
to one, with ‘one’ meaning the type of support is present. The types of support in the measure 
include 21 types of religious law or precepts that are enforced by the government, five types 
of institution or government activity intended to enforce religion (e.g. religious courts), 
11 ways the government can fund religion, six ways in which religious and government 
institutions can become entangled, and nine additional types of support. This measure ranges 
from zero to 52.  
The fourth variable measures acts of discrimination, harassment, prejudice, or violence 
against members of minority religions by members of society who are not representatives 
of the government. This measure is intended to measure societal attitudes toward religious 
64 For a more detailed discussion of sources, data collection procedures, a reliability analysis and a discussion of why RAS 
composite measures are additive rather than weighted see Fox, Political Secularism, Religion, and the State.
65 Jonathan Fox, “The RAS codebook,” The Religion and the State Project, www.religionandstate.org.
66 Fox, “The RAS codebook”.
67 Fox, Political Secularism, Religion, and the State, 106.
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minorities. While many, such as Grim and Finke,68 focus on attitudes, we posit that attitudes 
are difficult to measure in a comparable manner across countries and societies, but measuring 
concrete actions is far more feasible. This measure includes 27 types of actions, each coded 
individually on a scale of zero to three and based on severity, and including multiple types of 
public speech acts, vandalism, harassment, and violence (both against people and property). 
The resulting variable ranges from zero to 81. 
We examine each of these four variables on a yearly basis, dividing all countries into four 
categories (described in more detail above): core Arab Uprising states, other Arab Uprising 
states, other MENA Muslim-majority states, and non-MENA-Muslim majority states. 
4. Analysis 
Tables one and two show governmental religion policy between 2009 and 2014 in 49 
Muslim-majority countries. Governmental religious discrimination is rising overall in all 
four categories of the states examined. Among the core Arab Uprising states it increased in 
Bahrain, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen, and remained stable in Egypt and Syria. In Bahrain this 
was largely due to increased limitations of public expressions of religion by Shi’a Muslims 
and the destruction of Shi’a Mosques in 2011 during the Arab Uprising protests. In Libya 
and Tunisia it was due to the government’s inability or unwillingness to protect religious 
minorities from societal violence. In Yemen it was due to increased restrictions on the 
operating hours of Shi’a mosques.
Table 1- Governmental Religion Policy in Arab Uprising Countries and the Middle East
Governmental Religious Discrimination Religious Regulation Religious Support
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Core Arab Uprising
Bahrain 15 16 20 20 22 22 16 16 16 16 17 17 23 23 23 23 23 23
Egypt 46 46 46 46 46 46 25 25 24 18 24 29 27 27 27 27 27 27
Libya 20 19 19 22 22 22 32 32 24 11 11 11 20 20 21 24 23 23
Syria 22 23 23 -- -- -- 38 40 40 -- -- -- 21 21 21 -- -- --
Tunisia 25 25 27 27 27 27 31 31 27 30 31 32 11 11 12 13 13 13
Yemen 33 33 34 33 34 34 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Average 27.8 27.8 29.2 29.6 30.2 30.2 25.6 25.6 23.0 19.8 21.4 22.6 21.0 21.0 21.4 22.2 22.0 22.0
Other Arab Uprising
Jordan 34 34 34 34 34 34 21 21 21 21 21 26 30 30 30 30 30 30
Kuwait 34 34 35 35 35 35 18 18 18 18 18 18 28 28 28 29 29 29
Lebanon 13 13 13 13 13 14 4 4 4 4 4 4 21 21 21 21 21 21
Morocco 31 32 32 34 34 34 19 19 18 18 18 20 21 21 21 21 21 21
Oman 22 22 22 22 22 22 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 24
Saudi 
Arabia 78 78 78 80 80 80 41 41 41 41 41 41 46 46 46 46 46 46
Average 35.3 35.5 35.7 36.3 36.3 36.5 21.3 21.3 21.2 21.2 21.2 22.3 28.5 28.5 28.5 28.7 28.7 28.5
Avg. all 
Arab Spr. 31.9 32.0 32.7 33.3a 33.6a 33.6a 23.3 23.3 22.0 20.6 21.3 22.5 25.1 25.1 25.3 25.7 25.6 25.6
Other Middle East
Algeria 29 29 31 33 35 35 23 23 23 26 26 26 21 21 21 21 21 21
Gaza 19 19 19 20 19 19 18 18 18 18 19 18 28 28 28 28 28 30
Iran 71 71 71 71 71 71 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
Iraq 16 16 16 18 24 24 4 4 4 4 4 4 24 24 24 24 26 26
Iraqi 
Kurdistan 10 10 10 10 9 9 15 15 15 15 13 13 15 15 15 15 14 14
68 Grim and Finke, The Price of Freedom Denied.
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Governmental Religious Discrimination Religious Regulation Religious Support
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Palestinian 
Auth. 20 20 20 20 20 20 15 15 15 15 15 15 21 21 21 21 22 22
Qatar 39 39 39 39 39 39 22 22 22 22 22 25 26 26 26 26 26 27
Turkey 23 23 23 23 23 23 40 40 39 39 38 38 9 10 10 10 10 11
UAE 27 27 27 27 28 28 19 19 19 20 20 20 26 26 26 26 26 26
Western 
Sahara 31 32 32 34 34 34 19 19 18 18 18 20 21 21 21 21 21 21
Average 28.5 28.6 28.8 29.5 30.2 30.2 20.9 20.9 20.7 21.1 20.9 21.3 22.5 22.6 22.6 22.6 22.8 23.2
a = Significance of difference between marked year and 2009 < .05
Table 2- Governmental Religion Policy in Muslim-Majority Countries outside the Middle 
East
Governmental Religious 
Discrimination
Religious Regulation Religious Support
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Albania 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5
Azerbaijan 24 24 24 24 24 24 42 43 46 46 46 46 5 5 5 5 5 5
Bangladesh 6 6 6 6 6 6 17 18 18 18 18 18 14 14 14 14 14 14
Brunei 41 41 41 44 45 48 32 32 32 32 32 32 33 32 32 33 33 34
Burkina Faso 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5
Chad 8 8 8 8 8 8 13 13 13 13 13 13 6 6 6 6 6 6
Comoros 27 26 26 26 31 31 5 5 5 5 5 5 10 10 10 10 11 11
Cyprus, 
Turkish 14 14 15 14 14 14 4 4 4 6 8 8 4 4 5 5 7 6
Djibouti 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 12 12 16 15 22 11 11 11 11 11 12
Gambia 3 1 1 1 1 1 5 6 6 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 8 8
Guinea 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 7 7 7 7 7 8
Indonesia 40 40 40 40 40 41 22 22 22 22 23 23 33 33 33 33 33 34
Kosovo 6 6 6 6 7 6 4 5 5 6 6 7 6 6 6 7 7 7
Kyrgyzstan 25 26 25 27 26 26 37 37 37 39 39 39 3 3 3 3 3 3
Malaysia 39 40 41 42 42 42 29 29 29 29 29 29 36 36 36 36 36 36
Maldives 65 66 66 66 66 66 31 33 33 33 33 33 25 27 27 27 27 27
Mali 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5
Mauritania 23 22 22 24 24 25 14 14 14 14 14 15 15 15 16 16 16 16
Niger 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 17 16 16 16 16 3 4 4 4 4 4
Nigeria 20 20 20 20 20 21 12 12 12 12 12 12 20 20 20 20 20 20
Pakistan 43 43 43 43 44 44 20 20 20 20 20 20 32 32 32 32 32 32
Senegal 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 10 10 10 10 10 10
Sierra Leone 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 6 6 6
Somalia 12 12 12 12 15 12 7 7 7 7 7 7 19 19 19 19 19 19
Tajikistan 10 10 12 12 12 12 45 45 47 47 47 47 5 5 5 5 5 5
Turkmenistan 36 32 32 32 32 32 45 45 45 45 45 45 10 10 10 10 10 10
Uzbekistan 45 44 44 44 46 47 56 56 56 56 56 57 8 7 7 7 7 8
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Governmental Religious 
Discrimination
Religious Regulation Religious Support
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Average 18.2 18.0 18.1 18.4a 18.9a 19.0a 18.0 18.3 18.4 18.8a 18.9a 19.4b 12.5 12.6 12.7 12.7 13.0a 13.2c
a = Significance of difference between marked year and 2009 < .05
b = Significance of difference between marked year and 2009 < .01
c = Significance of difference between marked year and 2009 < .001
Similarly, in four of the other six states experiencing Arab Uprising, religious 
discrimination increased. In 2011, Kuwait began arresting non-Muslims for eating and 
smoking during Ramadan. In Lebanon in 2015, the mayor of Tripoli began requiring that non-
Muslim restaurants and cafés close during the fasting hours of Ramadan. In 2012, Morocco’s 
local authorities began closing unofficial house-churches where foreigners met to pray. In 
the same year, two Ahmadi brothers in Saudi Arabia were arrested and sent to a prison after 
refusing to recant their beliefs. This is the first recorded incidence of a governmental attempt 
at forced conversion in Saudi Arabia. In Jordan and Oman, levels of religious discrimination 
remained stable.
However, as noted above, these increases were not unique to Arab Uprising Muslim-
majority states. Average levels of governmental discrimination increased in other MENA 
states as well as in Muslim-majority states outside the MENA. Of these 49 states it decreased 
only in Iraqi Kurdistan, and only slightly at that; Iraqi Kurdistan, while having an independent 
government, is not an officially recognized country. The results were statistically significant 
for all Arab Uprising states combined, and for all non-MENA Muslim–majority states 
combined.
Religious support also does not distinguish the Arab Uprising states. Overall, religious 
support increased slightly in core Arab Uprising states but this was mostly due to Libya, 
where Islamic extremists set up religious courts and began applying Sharia criminal law 
and enforcing religion-specific laws such as dress codes for women. Increased support for 
religion was also evident in several MENA non-Arab Uprising states as well as in several 
Muslim-majority countries outside the MENA.
Superficially it appears that the regulation majority religions decreased in core Arab 
Uprising states as opposed to remaining stable or increasing in all three other categories 
of state. This is primarily due to a severe decrease in the regulation of Islam after the fall 
of Kaddafi’s regime in Libya. Also, by 2014, regulation of majority religions had increased 
overall in more states than it had decreased; the measurement of government regulation of 
majority religions is at best inconclusive.
Thus, overall, there is no evidence in this descriptive analysis that government policy in 
Arab Uprising states changed significantly in a manner differently from any other Muslim-
majority states.
The results for the occurrence of societal religious discrimination presented in table three, 
however, are different. Overall, core Arab Uprising countries have experienced an increase in 
societal discrimination, despite a lack of statistical significance in the average score. Societal 
discrimination increased in three of the core Arab Uprising states, with a dramatic increase 
in Libya. This includes an increase in non-violent activities, such as desecrations of Christian 
and Jewish cemeteries, anti-Christian and Jewish demonstrations, and the occurrence of 
property damage (such as an arson attack on the Coptic Church in Benghazi). It also includes 
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violent actions by civilian gangs and Islamic militia. Many of these attacks have been lethal, 
including the shooting of seven Coptic Christians in 2013, and beheadings in areas controlled 
by ISIS. In Tunisia the increase was dramatic, but less violent. It consisted of anti-Shi’a, anti-
Sufi, anti-Christian, and anti-Semitic sermons by clergy, vandalism of Jewish and Christian 
religious sites, and the harassment of some members of these groups. Between 2011 and 2013 
there was also a series of arson attacks against Sufi and Jewish religious sites. In Bahrain, the 
increase was modest and consisted of an increase of vandalism on Jewish and Shi’a property. 
While these results are not statistically significant, they also do not include Syria because 
the RAS3 dataset does not code countries with no effective government. Had Syria been 
included, the violent actions taken against Christians in the country would likely have 
resulted in a large increase in the score for societal discriminations. In addition, the societal 
discrimination scores for Egypt are the highest in the world for each year between 1999 and 
2014, making an increase less likely. Thus, it is arguable that the results for Syria and Egypt 
are skewing the average into a false negative.
The levels in the rest of the Muslim world remain relatively stable though societal 
discriminations increased as well as decreased by small amounts in several countries.  The 
only non-Arab Uprising countries in which the score for societal discrimination increased by 
more than one point were Malaysia and the Maldives.
Table 3- Societal Religious Discrimination in Muslim-Majority Countries
Middle East Non-Middle East
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Core Arab 
Uprising Albania 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bahrain 9 7 10 15 13 13 Azerbaijan 4 4 4 4 4 5
Egypt 62 61 61 61 61 61 Bangladesh 11 11 11 11 12 12
Libya 7 7 13 27 27 27 Brunei 3 3 3 3 4 4
Syria 6 6 6 -- -- -- Burkina Faso 0 0 0 1 0 0
Tunisia 3 3 17 19 17 18 Chad 1 1 1 1 1 1
Yemen 23 22 22 23 22 22 Comoros 6 6 6 6 6 6
Average 20.8 20.0 24.6 29.0 28.0 28.2 Cyprus, Turkish 4 4 4 4 4 4
Djibouti 5 5 5 5 5 6
Other Arab Uprising Gambia 1 1 1 1 1 2
Jordan 8 8 8 8 8 9 Guinea 1 1 1 1 2 3
Kuwait 7 7 9 7 8 7 Indonesia 43 43 44 45 43 43
Lebanon 11 19 19 20 19 19 Kosovo 20 23 20 21 22 20
Morocco 5 7 8 5 5 7 Kyrgyzstan 1 7 1 6 1 1
Oman 1 1 1 1 1 1 Malaysia 9 9 9 7 8 13
Saudi Arabia 10 10 10 10 10 11 Maldives 1 1 3 2 1 3
Average 7.0 8.7 9.2 8.5 8.5 9.0 Mali 0 0 0 4 0 0
Avg. all Arab 
Spr. 13.3 13.8 16.2 17.8 17.4 17.7 Mauritania 1 0 0 0 0 0
Niger 0 0 1 2 0 0
Other Middle East Nigeria 27 27 27 27 27 27
Algeria 2 5 2 4 3 5 Pakistan 49 49 49 49 49 49
Gaza 4 4 4 4 4 6 Senegal 2 2 4 2 2 2
Iran 19 19 20 21 21 20 Sierra Leone 3 0 0 0 0 0
Iraq 35 35 35 35 35 35 Somalia 10 10 10 10 10 10
Iraqi Kurdistan 1 1 3 2 1 1 Tajikistan 1 2 1 1 1 1
Palestinian 
Auth. 17 17 17 17 17 17 Turkmenistan 1 1 1 1 3 2
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Middle East Non-Middle East
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Qatar 2 2 2 2 2 2 Uzbekistan 1 1 1 2 2 1
Turkey 22 21 21 21 20 20 Average 7.6 7.8 7.7 8.0 7.7 8.0
UAE 4 4 4 4 4 4
Western 
Sahara 5 7 8 5 5 7
Average 11.1 11.5 11.6 11.5 11.2 11.7
No significant increases
5. Conclusion 
The Arab Uprising was extraordinary series of events that destabilized regimes across the 
MENA. Outcomes of the uprisings are still unfolding and the transition process taking 
place in Arab Uprising states is far from complete. Based on the literature on religious 
pluralism in transitional societies, such a transitional period should lead to increases of 
societal and governmental religious discrimination as well as in other types of governmental 
religion policy. However, our findings show that governmental discrimination, as well 
as governmental support for and regulation of religion, did not change significantly in 
comparison to other Muslim-majority states, either inside or outside of the MENA. However, 
societal discriminations did increase substantially in the Arab Uprising states in comparison 
to other Muslim-majority states.
One of the potential explanations for the findings on governmental religious discrimination 
is related to the fact that religious discrimination is on the rise globally.69 Another potential 
explanation involves the political traditions of Arab Uprising countries in comparison to 
those in post-Communist Europe, the latter having shaped transitional regime scholarship. 
As Romdhani70 puts it, 
Picking their way through the wreckage of Communism, the leaders of the 1989 European 
revolutions were able to tap into their own deep-rooted democratic traditions. The post-Arab 
Spring political classes had no such foundation, and were faced instead with a dreary and 
forbidding legacy of autocratic rule.
A quick look at tables one and two reveals high governmental religious discrimination 
trends in Muslim-majority states. Our results show that governmental discrimination 
increased in Arab Uprising states, but not in a manner different from other Muslim-majority 
states. However, the average scores of all the MENA states were already high before the Arab 
Uprising and although slightly lower, it was still high in Muslim majority states outside of 
the MENA. Similarly, Fox suggests that although there are notable exceptions, “[t]he Muslim 
world differs from the Christian world in that religious discrimination is considerably more 
common and severe, on average”. 71  In other words, in the short term, the societal dynamics 
of Muslim-majority states could more accurately measure the impact of the Arab Uprisings 
than government religion policies. 
Alternatively, increasing religious discrimination in other Muslim-majority states may 
be due to the reactionary policies of non-Arab Uprising States that are concerned with a 
diffusion of the Arab Uprisings movement into their countries. It may also be related to the 
69 Fox, Political Secularism, Religion, and the State; Fox, The Unfree Exercise of Religion.
70 Oussama Romdhani, “The Next Revolution: A Call for Reconciliation in the Arab World,” World Affairs 176, no. 4 (2013): 
89.  
71 Fox, The Unfree Exercise of Religion, 121.
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refugee crisis caused by a high number of citizens fleeing their homes in Syria. For instance, 
Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon receive many Syrian refugees. 72 In other words, although 
labeled as non-Arab Uprising Muslim-majority states, other states in the region may be 
indirectly impacted by the uprisings.  
Although consistent with previous scholarship on transitional regimes, our findings on 
societal discrimination may be the canary in the coal mine. Anderson73 suggests that 
the cultural context in the countries undergoing transition may be important to determining 
outcomes in the religious sphere. Most studies of societies undergoing transition in a liberal 
or democratic direction suggest that in the long term the evolution of a democratic mind-set 
or democratic political culture is important. In the first instance this may simply require that 
elites agree to play by the new ‘rules of the game’ and that they accept the legitimacy of the 
emerging system, but in the longer term it is argued that stability requires some form of mass 
acceptance of the political system and, if the democracy is to be truly ‘liberal’, the emergence 
of mass values accepting of difference and tolerant of alternative viewpoints. 
Similarly, Grim and Finke find that societal discrimination is often a precursor to 
governmental discrimination.74 Therefore, further research is not only helpful in understanding 
regional politics, but in preventing conflict in the region as well. 
This study adds to the literature on transitional regime and religious pluralism by 
incorporating the governmental religion policy trends in the Arab Uprising states. This 
is particularly true of our findings on societal discrimination in the Arab Uprising states. 
Our findings on governmental religious policies also advance our understanding of global 
religious policy.  Although the long-term consequences of the uprisings are still unfolding, 
this study shows that the Arab Uprisings did not usher in an era of religious pluralism and 
social acceptance of religious minorities.  
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